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Introduction
• WSTF Hydrogen Initiatives  
• WSTF Storage Initiatives
• Hydrogen Group Contact Information   
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Hydrogen Initiatives
• NASA WSTF Hydrogen Activities   
– Aerospace Test
– System Certification & Verification
– Component, System, & Facility Hazard Assessment
– Safety Training
• Technical Transfer
– Development of Voluntary Consensus Standards and 
P tirac ces
– Support of National Hydrogen Infrastructure 
Development
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Hydrogen Initiatives
• Research and Development  
– Combustion Hazard Characterization
– Component Development
– Safety Research
• Gaseous Leaks & Detection
• Liquid Hydrogen Spills
• Electrolyzer/Fuel Cell Test Bed
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Storage Initiatives
Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV)    
– Effects of Wear and Handling
– Effects of Aging
• Standards Development
• Inspection Training
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Aerospace Test
• Delta Clipper
H d T k• y rogen an  
Boiloff tests
DC-X Executes Vertical
Landing at WSMR
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Static Firing of DC-X with 4 
LOX/Hydrogen RL10-A5 Engines
System Certification & Verification
• Shuttle Flow Control Valve
Sh ttl LHRP• u e 
• PRSA
View of 6000 PSIA Tube Storage Bank for 
Flow Control Valve  
8Power Reactant Storage Assembly
Combustion Hazard Characterization
• Flammability & Ignition
• Fire Deflagration &
Tank Drop Test -- 75-ft-Dia Fireball 
from Explosion of 2,200 lb. LOX/LH2
, ,  
Detonation
• Blast & Explosion
1500 Gal LH2 Spill, 3 MPH Wind
Explosion of 50 lb. LOX/LH2
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at  High Energy Blast Facility
Combustion Hazard Characterization
• Combustion Hazard Handbooks
– Fuel Hand Book
Insert Image of H-O 
Vertical Det tube  
– Combustion White Paper
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Component, System, Facility Hazard 
A tssessmen
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Safety Training
• Hydrogen Safety Course [14 hrs]
• Operators Course [4 hrs]   
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WSTF Support of the NASA Safety Training Center
Development of Voluntary Consensus 
St d d & T h l T fan ar s  ec no ogy rans er
• Aerospace Hydrogen Consensus Standards    
Managed with AIAA
– AIAA/ANSI Guide to Safety of Hydrogen and 
Hydrogen Systems (G-095-2004)
• Support Review of ISO Commercial Standards 
f H d S tor y rogen ys ems
– ISO/TC 197 Hydrogen Technologies
Member of US Technical Advisory Group to ANSI–        
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Development of Voluntary Consensus 
Standards & Technology Transfer   
Phase I
Initiation
NASA identifies 
Phase II
Development
NASA and VCOs 
Phase III
Completion
VCOs establish and 
WSTF as lead 
for transfer of 
specific 
agree to transfer, 
with WSTF 
participation in 
maintain worldwide 
VC standards
standards to VC 
standards
technology transfer 
activities
Hazards AnalysesHazardous Fluids, 
Material and
Safety Courses
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Component R & D
Support of National Hydrogen
I f t t D l tn ras ruc ure eve opmen
• DOE National Hydrogen 
Infrastructure Assessment –
Sandia Labs Livermore  
• Unintended Releases
• Materials Compatibility 
• DOE Safety Panel
• Peer Review of Papers
1.4 kg GH2 at 5000 PSI in COPV
Bonfire Test with No Pressure Relief
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Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels 
(COPV)
•COPVs are high strength light weight  - , -  
containers for storing fuels and pressure 
media. 
• COPVs use a thin metal or non-metal liner        
over-wrapped with a high modulus fiber and 
cured with an epoxy matrix.
Detrimental Effects to COPV Strength
• Mechanical Damage - cut or broken fibers on       
surface or sub-surface.
• Manufacturing Defect - misaligned damaged 
tow, buckled liner, etc. 
• Stress Rupture - catastrophic failure due to long 
term sustained loading.
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Standards Development 
• AIAA S-081A: Space Systems - Composite      
Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs)
– Working group member
• NGV-2:  Compressed Natural/Hydrogen Gas
Vehicle (NGV/HGV) Fuel Containers
– Technical advisory group member
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COPV Visual 
I ti T i inspec on ra n ng
• Meets requirement in AIAA S-081A to have 
trained visual inspectors.
• Trains personnel to visually inspect the surface 
f i l ( i l bo  compos te pressure vesse s ma n y car on 
fiber) for indications of mechanical damage. The 
2-day course also explains the importance of       
positively identifying mechanical damage by the 
use of secondary NDE techniques.
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Cycle/Burst COPV
• Hydraulic Cycle Testing Up to 15K PSI
• Hydraulic Burst Testing of a Kevlar COPV
• High and Low Flow Rates at Various Volumes
• Axial Displacement, Strain Measurement 
(Conventional and Fiber Optic Bragg Grating), 
L d M t A ti E i i Eddoa  easuremen , cous c m ss ons, y 
Current, and Digital Image Correlation
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Stress Rupture
• Long-term, High-stress Sustained Load Testing    
• Numerous Fiber Systems on Experimental Test 
Bottles
• Dampened Pressure Systems Up to 6K PSI
• Ambient Temperature to -40 oF    
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COPV Analysis and Test Verification
• Integrated Composite and Structural Analysis    
(GENOA-PFA) 
• Allows Complex Composite Ply Definition
• Filament Winding Routines for Overwrapped Vessels  
– Cylindrical
– Spherical
• Verified Via Test and Evaluation (ASTM,WSTF, …)
• Combined Macro and Micromechanics Code
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Numerical Analysis of Complex
Composite Structures 
• Nonlinear Static & Dynamic    
• Creep
• Low and High Cycle Fatigue    
• Impact Simulation
• Progressive Failure Analysis  
– Damage Tracking
– Failure Mechanisms 
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Global and Local Analysis
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Fracture Pattern Processing to Structural 
Failure (Equilibrium Solution)
Non-Equilibrium Solution                      
of Failure of Structure
• Longitudinal Tensile  
Failure Pattern        (Fiber 
Breaks)
• 7720 psi
• Model ’11’
• Ply 3 next to liner
• Damage progression out
27Stress at Cycle 212 (5980 psi)
   
towards surfaces
Damage Evolution: Final fracture at 61.5 Mpa 
( Design Burst Pressure = 62 Mpa ) (AlphaSTAR)       
Failure  Mechanisms
D I iti ti D P ti Fi l F t 11 200 P i
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amage n a on amage ropaga on na  rac ure = ,  s
Facilities and Resources
• Expertise
– Resource for Proper Hydrogen Practice
– Systems Hazard Analysis
– Hydrogen Safety Training
– Standards Development
– Multidisciplinary Force
• Facility Resources
– Material Test
– Cleanroom
– Chemical Analysis
– System & Component Testing (concrete test cells (800 area)
– High Energy Blast Facility (<2000 lbs TNT eq. 700 area)
– Liquid & Gaseous Hydrogen Supply (250 area)
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Hydrogen Group Contact Information
NASA Program
• Harold Beeson [(505) 524-5542]
– Miguel Maes [(505) 524-5677]
– Nate Greene [(505) 525-7601]  
Contractor Support
– Larry Starritt (Group Lead) [(505) 524-5676]
– Stephen Woods (Technical Lead) [(505) 524-5607]
– Max Leuenberger
– Stephen McDougle
– Rose Sepulveda
– Craig Robinson
Chris Keddy
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